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1 Introduction
Economists have long been interested in the relationship between competition
and growth, but economic theory seems to be contradicted by the evidence.
Indeed, all the most important growth models in which there exists an imper-
fect competition (Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion
and Howitt (1992)) show a decreasing relationship between competition and
growth. However, recent empirical works (Aghion and Griffith (2005)) which
dispute the form of this relationship, find an inverted-U relationship between
competition and growth which is robust to many alternative specifications
and remains true in the data for many individual industries. In order to
reconcile theory with evidence, Aghion and Griffith (2005) and Bucci (2005)
extend the basic Schumpeterian endogenous growth model. The first one in-
troduce an escape competition effect in the Aghion and Howitt (1992) model
whereas the second one introduces an resource allocation effect in the Romer
(1990) model.
On the other hand, recent empirical works (Jones (1995a) and Jones
(1995b)) suggest that the scale effect which exists in the most important en-
dogenous growth models is not consistent with data. Many theoretical works
are removed the scale effect prediction from an innovation driven growth
model (see Aghion and Howitt (1998), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999),
Jones (1999), Jones (2005) and Bucci (2003) for a survey).
The purpose of this paper is to relate these two kinds of works in extending
the Bucci (2005) model. First, by following Benassy (1998), we introduce
a distinction between the returns to specialization and the market power
parameter which allows us to have a better measure of the competition.
Indeed, contrary to Bucci (2005), in our model the market power parameter
is not strongly related to the returns to specialization but it is completely
independent. Secondly, by following Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999), we
eliminate the scale effect.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section
3 analyzes the market equilibrium. Section 4 discuss the relationship between
competition and growth. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The model developed is based on the Bucci (2005) model. The economy
is structured by three sectors : final good sector, intermediate goods sector
and R&D sector. The final output sector produces output that can be used
for consumption using labor and intermediate goods that are available in A
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varieties. These are produced by employing only labor. The R&D sector
creates the blueprints for new varieties of intermediate goods which are pro-
duced by employing labor and knowledge. These blueprints are sold to the
intermediate goods sector.
2.1 The final good sector
In this sector, atomistic producers engage in perfect competition. The final
good sector produces a composite good Y using all the ith type of interme-
diate goods xi and labor LY .
3 Production is given by :
Y = Aγ+α−1L1−αY
∫ A
0
xαi di, (1)
where α and γ ∈ [0, 1] are two parameters. This production function allow
us to disentangle the degree of market power of monopolistic competitors in
the intermediate sector ( 1
α
− 1) and the degree of returns from specialization
(γ).4 Consequently, this model is a generalization of Bucci (2005) and Be-
nassy (1998) models.5
If we normalize to one the price of the final good, the profit of the represen-
tative firm is given by :
piY = A
γ+α−1L1−αY
∫ A
0
xαi di−
∫ A
0
pixidi− wYLY , (2)
where wY is the wage rate in the final goods sector, pi is the price of the ith
intermediate good. Under a perfect competition on the final output market
and the factor inputs markets, the representative firm chooses intermediate
goods and labor in order to maximize its profit taking price as given and
subject to its technological constraint. The first order conditions are the
followings :
∂piy
∂xi
= αAγ+α−1L1−αY x
α−1
i − pi = 0, (3)
∂piy
∂Ly
= (1− α)Aγ+α−1L−αY
∫ A
0
xαi di− wY = 0. (4)
3Time subscripts are omitted whenever there is no risk of ambiguity.
4Benassy (1996) made a simple modification to the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model
which clearly disentangles taste for variety and market power. At the same time, Benassy
(1998) and de Groot and Nahuis (1998) show that the introduction of this modification in
an endogenous growth model with expanding product variety a` la Grossman and Helpman
(1991) affects the welfare analysis.
5Indeed, we obtain the Bucci (2005) model if we introduce the following constraint
γ = 1−α. In the same way, in introducing the constraint LY = 1, we obtain the Benassy
(1998) model.
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Equation (3) is the inverse demand function for the firm that produces the ith
intermediate good whereas equation (4) characterizes the demand function
of labor.
2.2 The intermediate goods sector
In the intermediate goods sector, producers engage in monopolistic compe-
tition. Each firm produces one horizontally differentiated intermediate good
and have to buy a patented design before producing its own intermediate
good. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Bucci (2005), we assume
that each local intermediate monopolist has access to the same technology
employing only labor li :
xi = li. (5)
The profit function of firms is the following :
pii = pixi − wili, (6)
where wi is wage rate in the intermediate goods. Under the assumption that
in the intermediate goods sector the number of firms is so large that each of
them is unconstrained by competitors offering an equivalent product,6 the
profit maximizing price of ith intermediate good is given by :
pi =
wi
α
. (7)
At the equilibrium, all the firms produce the same quantity of intermediate
goods x, face the same wage rate w and by consequence fix the same price
for their production p. The price is equal to a constant mark up 1
α
− 1
over the marginal cost w. Defining by Li =
∫ A
0
lidi, the total amount of
labor employed in the intermediate goods sector and under symmetry among
intermediate goods producers, we can rewrite the equation (5) :
xi =
Li
A
. (8)
Finally, the profit function of the firm which produces the ith intermediate
good is :
pii = α(1− α)Y
A
. (9)
6This assumption implies that each intermediate goods firm acts as local monopolistic.
Formally, we have ∂∂xi
[∫ A
0
xαi di
]
= 0.
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As in Bucci (2005), the profit is decreasing in the number of intermediate
goods (A) and the relationship between competition and profit is inverted U
shaped.7
2.3 The R&D sector
There are competitive research firms undertaking R&D. These firms produce
designs indexed by 0 through an upper bound A ≥ 0.8 Designs are patented
but non-rival and indispensable for intermediate goods production. Follow-
ing Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999), we assume that new blueprints are
produced using old blueprints A, an amount of R&D labor LA and the labor
force L :
∂A
∂t
=
ALA
L
. (10)
This formulation of the firm research process allows us to eliminate the scale
effect which is inconsistent with time series evidence (Jones (1995a) and
Jones (1995b))9. Because of the perfect competition in the R&D sector,
we can obtain the real wage in this sector in function of the profit flows
associated to the latest intermediate in using the zero profit condition :
wALA =
∂A
∂t
PA, (11)
where wA represents the real wage earned by R&D labor and PA is the real
value of such a blueprint which is equal to :
PA =
∫ ∞
t
piie
−r(τ−t)dτ, τ > t, (12)
since the research sector is competitive, the price of the ith design at time t
will be equal to the discounted value of the flow of instantaneous profits that
is possible to make in the intermediate goods sector by the ith firm from t
onwards.
Given PA, the free entry condition leads to :
wA =
APA
L
. (13)
7Bucci and Parello (2006) obtains the same result about the relationship between the
profit and the number of intermediate goods.
8As in Romer (1990), A measures the total stock of society’s knowledge.
9For a survey about this question, see Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999) and Jones
(2005).
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2.4 The consumer behavior
The demand side is characterized by the representative household who con-
sumes and supplies labor. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), we
assume that the utility function of this consumer is logarithmic10 :
U =
∫ ∞
0
e(n−ρ)t log(c)dt, (14)
where c = C
L
is per-capita private consumption, ρ > 0 is the rate of pure time
preference. The representative household are endowed with a fixed quantity
of labor L. The flow budget constraint for the household is
∂a
∂t
= w + ra− c, (15)
where a is the total wealth of the agent (measured in units of final good), w
is the wage rate per unit of labor services and r is the real interest rate. From
the maximization of the consumer, the necessary and sufficient conditions for
a solution use the Keynes-Ramsey rule :
gc = r − ρ, (16)
and the transversality condition.
lim
t→∞
µtat = 0, (17)
where µt is the co-state variable.
3 The equilibrium and the steady state
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium and give some analytical
characterization of a balanced growth path.
3.1 The equilibrium
It is now possible to characterize the labor market equilibrium in the economy
considered. On this market because of the homogeneity and the perfect
mobility across sectors, the arbitrage ensures that the wage rate that is earned
by salaries which work in the final goods sector, intermediate goods sector
10This specification of the utility function does not alter the results.
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or R&D sector is equal. As a result, the following three conditions must
simultaneously be checked :
1 = sY + si + sA, (18)
wi = wy, (19)
wi = wA, (20)
where sY , si and sA represents the shares of the total labor supply devoted
respectively to final and intermediate goods production and to research ac-
tivity. Equation (18) is a resource constraint, saying that at any point in the
time the sum of the labor demands coming from each activity must be equal
to the total available supply (L). Equation (19) and equation (20) state that
the wage earned by one unit of labor is to be the same irrespective of the
sector where that unit of labor is actually employed.
We can characterize the product market equilibrium in the economy con-
sidered. Indeed, on this market, the firms produce a final good which can be
consumed. Consequently, the following condition must be checked :
Y = C. (21)
Equation (21) is a resource constraint on the final good sector.
3.2 The steady state
In order to define the steady state, we assume that all variables as Y , C, A,
LY , Li, LA and L grow at a positive constant rate.
Proposition 1 If L grows at a positive growth rate gL = n > 0, then all the
other variables grow at strictly positive rates with
gY = (1− α)gLY + αgLi + γgA, (22)
gY = gC , (23)
gA = sA. (24)
Proof. We substitute equation (8) into equation (1), then we log-differentiate
the equation (1) and finally we obtain the equation (22). From the equilib-
rium on the product market, given by the equation (21), it easy to find the
equation (23). From the definition of the firm research process, given by the
equation (10), we obtain the equation (24).
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Using the previous equations, we can demonstrate the following steady
state equilibrium values for the relevant variables of the model11 :
r = n((α− 1)α + 1)γ − (ρ+ (α− 1)α(ρ+ 1))γ + ρ, (25)
si = α
2(1 + ρ− n), (26)
sY = (α− 1)(n− ρ− 1), (27)
sA = n((α− 1)α+ 1)− ρ− (α− 1)α(ρ+ 1), (28)
gY = ((α− 1)α+ 1)γn+ n− γ(ρ+ (α− 1)α(ρ+ 1)). (29)
According to the equation (25), the real interest rate is constant. Equations
(26), (27) and (28) give the amount of labor in each sector at the equilibrium.
Equation (29) shows that the growth rate is a function of technological,
preference parameters (γ, n, ρ) and competition (α).
4 The relationship between product market
competition and growth
In this section, we study the long run relationship between competition and
growth in the model presented above. As it is well known in the IO literature,
all the authors use the so-called Lerner Index to gauge the intensity of market
power within a market. Such an index is defined by the ratio of price (P )
minus marginal cost (CM) over price. Using the definition of mark up (P =
Markup ∗ CM) and Lerner Index (LernerIndex = P−CM
P
), we are able to
define a proxy of competition as follows12
(1− LernerIndex) = α. (30)
Proposition 2 We show that
(i) there exists an inverted-U relationship between product market compe-
tition and aggregate economic growth,
(ii) the returns of specialization alter this relationship only quantitatively.
Indeed, the returns to specialization amplifies the impact of competition
to growth,
11We assume that n < ρ < n+ 1(α−1)α+1 − 1 in order to have all the variables positive.
12This is the same measure of product market competition used by Aghion, Bloom,
Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005), Aghion and Griffith (2005), Aghion and Howitt
(2005), Bianco (2007a) and Bianco (2007b).
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(iii) the returns to specialization does not affect the maximum economic
growth rate which is always obtained for a specific value of competition
(α = 1
2
).
Proof.
(i)
∂gY
∂α
= (2α− 1)γ(n− ρ− 1). (31)
As ρ > n > 0, we have n − ρ − 1 < 0. Or, as γ > 0, the sign of the
derivative is given by the opposite sign of 2α − 1. Finally, we obtain
that ∂gY
∂α
> 0 if and only if 0 ≤ α < 1
2
and ∂gY
∂α
< 0 if and only if
1
2
< α ≤ 1.
(ii) Let note that ∂gY
∂α
= f(γ). We obtain ∂f(γ)
∂γ
= (2α − 1)(n − ρ − 1). As
n − ρ − 1 < 0, then the sign of the derivative is given by the opposite
sign of (2α − 1). Finally, ∂f(γ)
∂γ
> 0 if and only if 0 ≤ α < 1
2
and
∂f(γ)
∂γ
< 0 if and only if 1
2
< α ≤ 1.
(iii) we can show that ∂gY
∂α
= 0 if and only if α = 1
2
.
In order to illustrate our view, we plot equation (29) in order to show
the relationship between the economic growth rate (gY ) and the competition
(α) for different values of the returns to specialization (γ), we obtain the
following figure13.
13In drawing Figure 1, we take the same values of parameters like Bucci (2005) in
order to be as close as possible to his model : ρ = 0.03. However, since our model is a
generalization of the Bucci (2005) model, we need to choose a value for the growth rate of
the population n = 0.01 and the returns to specialization 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
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Figure 1: Relationship between competition (α) and growth (gY ) for different
values of the returns to specialization (γ)
This kind of relationship between competition and growth can be ex-
plained by two effects : profit incentive effect and resource allocation effect.
The first one means that an increase of competition (α) reduces the price
of the intermediate good and profits. This latter determines the incentives
to innovation. Therefore, the profit incentive effect seems to predict an un-
ambiguously negative relationship between product market competition and
growth along the entire range of competition intensity. The second one is
explained by the substitution of labor between each sector.
Proposition 3 We have
(i) a decreasing relationship between the competition and the share of labor
allocated to the final good sector,
(ii) an increasing relationship between the competition and the share of labor
allocated to the intermediate goods sector,
(iii) an inverted-U relationship between competition and the share of labor
allocated to the research sector.
Proof.
(i)
∂sY
∂α
= n− ρ− 1. (32)
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As ρ > n > 0, we have n− ρ− 1 < 0. Therefore, ∂sY
∂α
< 0.
(ii)
∂si
∂α
= −2α(n− ρ− 1). (33)
As ρ > n > 0, we have n− ρ− 1 < 0. As 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, we have ∂si
∂α
> 0.
(iii)
∂sA
∂α
= (2α− 1)(n− ρ− 1). (34)
As ρ > n > 0, we have n− ρ− 1 < 0. So, the sign of the derivative is
given by the opposite sign of 2α− 1. Finally, we obtain that ∂sA
∂α
> 0 if
and only if 0 ≤ α < 1
2
and ∂sA
∂α
< 0 if and only if 1
2
< α ≤ 1.
An increase of competition affects negatively the share of labor devoted
to final goods sector (sY ), positively the share of labor devoted to interme-
diates goods sector (si) and has a non linear effect on the share of labor
allocated to the research sector (sA). Consequently, this means that the re-
source allocation effect seems to predict an inverted-U relationship between
product market competition and growth. Finally, the association of this two
effects implies that the relationship between product market competition and
growth is inverted-U shaped as we can see on the previous figure.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between returns to specialization,
competition and growth in an endogenous growth model with expanding
product variety without scale effects. More precisely, on the one hand, fol-
lowing Benassy (1998), we disentangle returns to specialization from market
power parameter in order to have a better measure of competition in the
intermediate goods sector, and following Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999),
we eliminate the scale effects, on the other hand. We found a inverted U re-
lationship between competition and growth. This relationship is due to the
interplay between two effects : Schumpeterian and resource allocation ef-
fects. The former implies an negative links between competition and growth.
On the other hand, the latter induces an effect of competition on growth
which depends on the level of the competition. For low values of competi-
tion, the competition has an positive effect on growth and for high values
of competition, the competition reduces growth. We also show that the re-
turns to specialization does not affect qualitatively but only quantitatively
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the relationship between competition and growth. Indeed, the returns to
specialization amplifies the impact of competition to growth. Clearly, more
work is needed. Indeed, it would be interesting to analyze if this result is
robust to the introduction of alternative ways of cleaning the scale effect.
Appendix
In these appendix, we describe the way followed in order to obtain the main
results of this paper (25 through 29). Using the equations (3, 4, 7, 8 and 19),
we obtain :
si =
α2sY
1− α. (35)
Using the equations (4, 8, 12 and 13), we obtain :
sY =
gA − gY + r
α
. (36)
Using the equations (16, 23, 24) and the definition of per capita private
consumption, the previous equation can be re-written as :
sY =
sA + ρ− n
α
. (37)
Plugging the equation (37) into the equation (35), we obtain :
si =
α(sA + ρ− n)
1− α . (38)
Using the condition of equilibrium on the labor market (given by the equation
18), we obtain :
sA = n((α− 1)α+ 1)− ρ− (α− 1)α(ρ+ 1). (39)
From the equations (22, 24 and 39) and assuming that gLi = gLY = gL = n
which is true at the steady state, we obtain :
gY = ((α− 1)α+ 1)γn+ n− γ(ρ+ (α− 1)α(ρ+ 1)). (40)
Plugging the equation (39) into the equation (37), we find :
sY = (α− 1)(n− ρ− 1). (41)
Using the equations (38 and 39), we obtain :
si = α
2(1 + ρ− n). (42)
From the equations (16, 40) and the definition of per capita private consump-
tion, we find :
r = n((α− 1)α + 1)γ − (ρ+ (α− 1)α(ρ+ 1))γ + ρ. (43)
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